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Article 8

THE NO FAULT CONCEPT: IS THIS THE FINAL STAGE
IN THE EVOLUTION OF DIVORCE?
I. Introduction
In the past twenty years society has been screaming for more realistic divorce
grounds. Since the 1969 removal of fault-based grounds for divorce in California,1 state after state has started reform. As more and more states begin to reform
their divorce law, it becomes evident that state legislatures do pay attention to
the practicing bar and the social scientists. The legislators have responded to
the pleas with a variety of different approaches based upon the "no fault" or
marital breakdown concept. An analysis of the different types of statutes indicates that, with the possible exception of Iowa, the legislators are probably off
the target.
This article will summarily trace a history of the law of divorce and its
development from "no fault" to marital fault and back, attempting to look at
the interrelated social developments. It will then examine three current types
of "no fault" divorce statutes and indicate some inherent problems within these
statutes. Finally, the article will propose an alternative to the present forms of
divorce, based upon marital breakdown principles.
II. The Evolutionary History of Divorce
The law of divorce, like other laws, runs in an historical circle. In the early
days of the Roman Republic, divorce was a matter of civil contract and freely
terminable at will, but within the family traditional mores exercised strict controls making divorce relatively rare.2 In the few divorces that occurred, the
courts were resorted to only in matters of property settlement for couples who
had privately decided upon divorce.' It was in the later Roman Republic that
the law began its circle of development. As the traditional family mores broke
down, divorce became more commonplace. Family life broke down completely.
Some marriages would last only a matter of days. It was during this period that
Rome became known for the riotously free life style that is traditionally depicted
in books and movies.
The reaction to the widespread abuses in the Roman way of life brought
about the development of the fault-oriented doctrine. The Stoic philosophers
and early Christians who disapprovingly witnessed the sexual freedom of the
time eventually caused the pendulum to begin its swing to the other extreme.4
Surprisingly, when the empire became Christian, it did little to affect private
Roman law. The only exception was divorce.' As the Catholic Church became
stronger, the doctrine of indissoluble marriage began to develop.
I

Crv. CODE §§ 4506-4507 (West 1970).
Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of the Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L. 179,
185 (1968).
3 Mace, Marriage Breakdown or Matrimonial Offence: A Clinical or Legal Approach
to Divorce? 14 Am. U. L. REv. 178, 180 (1965).
4 Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 186.
5 A. WATSON, TE LAW OF THE ANCIENT RoMANs 36 (1970).
2
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Constantine, the emperor responsible for the conversion of the Empire,
enacted that if one spouse divorced the other (except for certain specified
causes), then in addition to the existing penalties affecting the dowry, an
offending wife could be deported and an offending husband could not marry
again. If he did remarry, the divorced wife could seize the second wife's
dowry."
Again, the law went through a series of developments. Christianity had so little
effect upon the law of Rome that even after these penalties were imposed, the
divorce was still valid.' Roman law was never to exercise jurisdiction over the
marital termination per se.8 Considering these developments, Max Rheinstein
has said:
No court decree or other act of government was ever required in Rome
as a constituent element of a divorce and never was there engendered the
idea that a divorce would not be possible except upon 'cause'.
It was not until the Middle Ages that divorce based upon marital fault
became the only divorce available. The absence of any formal regulation of
marriage and divorce which was characteristic for Rome, as well as for the
Germanic peoples, was changed by the element which entered into the making
of the Middle Ages, i.e., Christianity."0 Because of Charlemagne, one of the
most powerful lords of the Middle Ages, who baptized thousands by the sword
and granted vast power to the Church, 1 the Ecclesiastical Courts of the
Church were entrusted to deal with marital problems throughout all of Christendom. 2 It was in this period that the Ecclesiastical Courts raised marriage
to the dignity of a sacrament.18 A spouse could only dream of divorce during
those days of knightly honor and chivalry. The Ecclesiastical Courts had a
strong grip upon society. The Church had succeeded in making its courts and
its matrimonial law effective everywhere from Scandinavia to Sicily and from
Portugal to the Territory of the Teutonic Knights on the shores of the Baltic.'
Based upon Church doctrine, the Ecclesiastical Courts made marriage a bond
that "no man" may "put asunder."'" It became the law of the land. The
Church was not able to do this without certain concessions. These concessions
manifested themselves in annulment" and separation, or divorce from bed and
6 Id. at 36.
7 Id.
8 Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to Present
Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267, 271 (1971).
9 Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 7 (1953).
10 Id. at 8.
11 See H. DAvis, CHARLEMAGNE: THE HERO Or Two NATIONS (1899); H. LAMB,
Charlemagne was known as the ruler
CHARLEMAGNE: THE LEGEND AND THE MAN (1954).
and lawgiver. Although he was a devout Christian attending Mass daily and known as a
divorced and married several times.
and
Defender of the Church, he tended to uxoriousness,
He never permitted his daughters to marry, although he generally tolerated illicit unions on
their part so long as they stayed at home. The Church kept silent during his lifetime; so
faithful a defender could not be refused some trifling indulgence.
12 Mace, supra note 3, at 180.
13 Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 8.
14 Id. at 10.
15 Mark 10:9.
16 Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 10.
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board." Annulment is based upon the ground that no marriage has taken place,
and thus doesn't concern itself with fault or a termination of marriage. The
parties simply discontinue a marriage, which was never really a marriage in the
first place."8 Divorce from bed and board was really only separation. It was
allowed only for matrimonial offence, usually adultery or cruelty, and did not
include the right to remarry. 9 Divorce from bed and board was in fact no
divorce at all. This remedy only allowed the aggrieved spouse to live apart
from the offending spouse. Perhaps it hould be pointed out that in the Middle
Ages, as well as today, in countries still influenced by the Catholic Church, the
mistress system was openly accepted and tolerated as a part of normal social
life.2" The doctrine of indissolubility of marriage came to final solidification at
the Council of Trent in 1563, where it was declared
to be a part of Church
21
doctrine, though not dogma, of the Catholic faith.
During the latter stage of this pronounced swing in the law of divorce, the
Protestant Reformation began. As a later development of the Reformation itself,
the law of marriage and divorce again became a matter of civil contract. The
Reformation exerted its influence in two ways, it repudiated the sacramental
nature of marriage, and returned the matter of adjudication of family law to
the courts of the state. As characterized by Luther, marriage was a wholly
external thing, subject to secular jurisdiction.22 The reformers all agreed that
marriage dissolution should be allowed and the reformers had different opinions
only on the matter of grounds.2" In the words of John Knox, divorce should
be permitted for adultery.
Marriage once it is lauchfullie contracted may not be dissolved at manis
pleasour, as oure Maister, Jesus Christ, doth witness, onles adulterie be
commited; which being sufficientlie proven in the presence of the civil
magistrate, the innocent (yf thei so requyre) ought to be pronounced24 frie,
and the offender ought to suffer the death as God hath commanded.
Although the courts would now grant a divorce absolute with the privilege
to remarry,2" the old rules of the Ecclesiastical Courts had left their mark. The
old grounds for separation in the Ecclesiastical Courts were transferred to the
civil courts as the basis for an absolute divorce with the privilege to remarry.
At the same time during this development, the Ecclesiastical Courts continued
to prosper, proclaiming marriage indissoluble, granting only annulments.
It was during the Middle Ages, sometimes called the Dark Ages (correctly
so where divorce law is concerned), that the fault-oriented approach became
17 Mace, supra note 3, at 180.
18 Pospishil, The Problem of Divorce in the Catholic Church, 7 J. FAM. L. 595, 604
(1968).
19 Mace, supra note 3, at 180.

20 Walker, supra note 8, at 274.

21 Pospishil, supra note 18, at 600. Msgr. Pospishil points out that because this doctrine
is not dogma the Catholic Church could actually change the doctrine without a great deal
of difficulty.
22 Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 10.
23

0. R.

MCGREGOR, HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 5

24 Id.
25 Mace, supra note 3, at 181.
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entrenched in the law. It is interesting to note that the influence of the Church
is only in the development of Western divorce. In the Western countries where
the Church played such a major role, the divorce law went through these confusing stages of development. In the Eastern Orthodox church, which parted from
the Western church during the early phases of development, dissolution of marriage was permitted. All Eastern Christian churches still permit divorce and
remarriage.2" In Muslim countries where religion also exerts a great influence,
but in different moral and ethical backgrounds, divorce is obtained by the husband saying three times "I divorce thee." 27 In another religiously based society,
the Jewish setting, there was surprisingly little authorized regulation of marriage.
Divorce was freely permissible to the husband, subject only to informal censure
by the community.2 8
The present day movement in the United States for more realistic divorce
grounds is a development of the last forty years. For the most part, the criticism
came from the social sciences; only very recently has it been from the law
schools and the practising bar. However, divorce based upon grounds other
than fault is not a new idea. The Soviet Union was probably one of the first
countries of modern times to adopt the marital-breakdown approach. Marriage
and divorce were among the first institutions to be affected by the earliest Soviet
decrees. In December, 1917, the Soviet regime introduced divorce in which no
statement of fault was required.29 For a time divorce was permitted by registration of only one of the parties.2 " Today divorce with no statement of fault is
the sole basis upon which divorce can be granted in the 'Soviet Union and most
communist countries. 1
Although the law has been modernized since its first introduction, as early
as 1959, Australia had a so-called "no fault" divorce statute in the form of a
living separately statute. The statute only required that the parties live separately
for five years.2 2 By 1966 the marital-breakdown approach to divorce was already
in effect in some form in Greece, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and Japan. Further, in Japan about 90% of all divorces are supposedly granted upon mutual consent of the couple.2
In the United States the progress has been at a much slower rate. Several
states had made attempts at improving the law by adopting "incompatibility of temperament" statutes. Such statutes were adopted by Alaska,2"
New Mexico" and Oklahoma.2 These statutes were not the beginning of the
marital-breakdown approach in the United States because the judges in these
jurisdictions, through judicial gloss, included all of the old time-honored prin26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35

36

Pospishil, supra note 18, at 596.
Walker, supra note 8. at 274.
Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 8.
Gsovski, Marriageand Divorce in Soviet Law, 35 GEo. L.J. 209 (1947).
Walker, supra note 8, at 274.
Mace, supra note 3, at 182.
Finlay, Divorce Law Reform: The Australian Approach, 10 J. F.m. L. 1, 4 (1970).
Mace, supra note 3, at 182.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110(5)'(c) (1962).
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(8) '(1953).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271(7) (1961).
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ciples of fault in determining "incompatibility."

7

At the same time, the courts

in other states were making significant contributions to family law. The Supreme
Court of California had done away with the doctrine of recrimination." Other
courts were simply tolerating uncontested divorces and divorces based upon the
dubious ground of extreme cruelty.
It has been reported that the average uncontested divorce proceeding in
California occupies less than 10 to 15 minutes of the court's time. It is
hard, therefore, for even the most naive observer to believe that fifteen
minutes of "justice" can ever reveal the truth of the couple's marital difficulties that may have been fermenting for months, or even years.39
In 1966 the state of New York, which had allowed divorce for adultery
only, attempted legislative reform. The new law amounted to nothing more
than the addition of some more fault grounds for divorce, plus the adoption of
a restrictive living apart statute."0 The statute was a so-called "no fault" statute,
but the consent of both parties was needed.4 During this period of development, many people began to recognize the need for a complete examination and
reform of the entire system. Finally, in 1969, the California legislature became
the first state to take the dramatic step of completely revamping its divorce
law.4 2 Since the passage of the California law, the states of Iowa,43 Michigan, 4
and New Jersey 5 have also enacted legislation which has substantially reformed
their respective divorce laws.
III. The View of the Social Sciences
While divorce law continued in its circle of development, it had its effect
on the community. Since the divorce law on the books did not reflect the
demands of society, the courts began to administer a law that was different from
the law on the books. Collusion between the parties was considered to be a bar
to a cause of action of divorce, yet many couples agreed to get a divorce. The
procedure was quite simple, one spouse would agree not to contest. The courts
tolerated the situation because of a lack of desire to prove collusion-a manifest
disagreement with the law.
In many states more than 90% of all the divorces granted were uncontested.4 In New York, where adultery was the only grounds for divorce, a
distraught husband would contemplate agreeing to be found in a hotel room
with someone he had never met, thereby establishing a legal ground. Mrs. Bodenheimer suggests a case where two husbands in collusion could use wife-swapping
37
38
39
40

Kleinfeld & Moss, A Divorce Reform Act, 5 HARv. J. LEois. 563, 565 (1968).
DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
Walker, supra note 8, at 284.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1972).

41

Id.

42
43
44
45
46

§ 4506-4507 (West 1970).
IowA CODE § 598 '(Supp. 1971).
Micir. Comp. LAws ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1971).
N.J. REv.STAT. § 2A:34-2 (Supp. 1972).
CAL. COv. CODE

Kleinfeld & Moss, supra note 37, at 569.
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as a means to obtain divorce on grounds of adultery."' These situations reflect
what was actually taking place in society. They indicate that a law, which presumes a happy marriage until there is evidence of fault, can be based upon a
faulty assumption.
Timothy Walker, a sociologist/lawyer, describes the conduct in terms of
"law-avoidance" and "law-accommodation." Law-avoidance is conduct which
achieves a similar goal to that provided by the law by a means totally outside
the legal system.4" In divorce law it manifests itself in different forms. In the
]ower classes of England, a spouse could easily rid himself of an unwanted mate,
although divorce was generally prohibited. The spouse simply left, since most
were never legally married in the first place. 9 By keeping the marriage outside
the legal system, divorce was made easy. In America "common law divorce"
has always been popular among the lower economic classes. Why should a fellow spend time and money attempting to get a divorce that was unobtainable?
It was much easier to obtain the so-called "poor man's divorce" of desertion."
Law-accommodation is conduct which operates within the system in order
to obtain a result provided by that legal system. The idea is to stay within the
grounds of the law for social acceptability. The letter of the law is stretched to
its very limits, but it is never broken." Two of the most common examples of
this kind of conduct are divorce grounded upon cruelty and the uncontested
divorce. It is worth noting that the two go hand in hand. Over 90% of all
uncontested American divorces are based upon cruelty. 2 According to Walker:
The behavior pattern of judges in such situations is one of law-accommodation - of administering the procedures of the adversary system in form
only by requiring the presentation of corroborated evidence of fault by the
spouse in the court room. And too many times the presentation of this
evidence assumes the character of a well-rehearsed and too-often-repeated
one-act play. 53
One of the most interesting examples of law-accommodation in the area
of divorce was the "shoebox divorce." It was a curious blend of unconscious
law-avoidance on the part of the couple, and law-accommodation upon the part
of a court clerk. In the South, when a Negro couple got married, the court
clerk would put the license in a shoebox, never recording it. If the marriage
failed, the couple would go to him for a divorce whereupon he would destroy
the unrecorded marriage license.54 The most popular combination of law-avoidance and law-accommodation in recent times has been the migratory divorce.
Since there is relative strictness or laxity in various state divorce laws, one can
easily go to another state with a lax law, declaring an intent of domicile. The
spouse obtains his divorce and immediately returns home. This represents law47

48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 181.

Walker, supra note 8, at 269.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 280.
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avoidance on the part of the spouse who flees the strict divorce law of his true
domicile, and law-accommodation on the part of the states.5"
The social scientists were the first to point out the major problems with
divorce law. They recognized early that the effect the law was having was diametrically opposed to its intent. Divorce is an adjustment of relationship that
does not erase the past or create a totally unrelated future." Divorce law should
foster viable family relationships, but when this is not possible, it should resolve
the differences through divorce with a minimum amount of conflict.5" If a divorce is the result, it should help the parties learn from the experience. Under
the fault-oriented approach, it was not possible. The parties were shoved into
an adversary process and forced to point fault at the other party to obtain divorce. This was not done without effects. The finger pointing exacerbated the
aggressive forces already destroying the family. The resentment that grew made
it almost impossible for an attempt at reconciliation. It also created an emotionally charged atmosphere, causing a great deal of difficulty in issues of finance
and child custody.5
Another important factor is that the outmoded fault system attempted to
require people, whose marriage had obviously broken down, to live together.
This happened in either one of two ways. First, if there had been no incidence
of fault, the courts presumed that a happy marriage existed. Although there
had been no technical fault, this was not always a valid presumption. The
second problem arose when both spouses were at fault. Until DeBurgh v.
DeBurgh, recrimination or the "clean hands theory" of equity would bar an
award of divorce in almost every state.59 A husband who beat his wife, and a
wife who committed adultery, could not get a divorce. The resulting effects of
such a situation can be disastrous. In many cases, it may lead to harm far
greater to society and the individual than divorce. It can lead a spouse to set
up housekeeping with a partner of his choice, and ultimately establishing an
illegitimate family6 0 It leaves many children in an unhappy, stress-filled environment to be raised. It is widely recognized that the initial proceeding of divorce
itself can be traumatic to children in certain age groups.6 1 The disorganized
family is generally considered to be a major factor in juvenile delinquency and
child neglect. It is not so much the broken home, but the contentious, quarreling,
unstable home that is most often the cause of maladjusted children6 2
In the words of Max Weber, rules are usually observed because of their
apparent utility, 3 but the divorce rules were not responsive to what had occurred
in society. Technology had brought about remarkable changes in society. Wom55 Id. at 283.
56 Westman & Cline, Divorce is a Family Affair, 5 FAm. L.Q. 1 '(1971).
57 Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Divorce Grounds: A Model Statute & Commentary,
3 FAM. L.Q. 75, 78 (1969).
58 Id. at 81.
59 Until the DeBurgh case, when both parties were at fault, no divorce could be granted.
The state denied the divorce because neither spouse was free from fault.
60 N-w JERSEY, FINAL REPORT OF DIVORCE LAW STUDY COMMISSION 7-10 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Nnw JERSEY REPORT].
61 Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 191.
62 Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw &
63

CONTEMP.

PROS. 49, 51 (1953).

M. WEBER, Ow LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 113-5 (Rheinstein ed. 1954).
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en were no longer dependent upon men for their well-being. As women became
more independent, it was no longer necessary for courts to judiciously protect
the marriage relationship. The courts had begun to accommodate the law to
the needs of society, while the legislatures continually refused to change the law.
People, realizing the futility of the law, had begun to take makidmum advantage
of the methods of law-avoidance. Gradually, disrespect for the divorce court
and the divorce lawyer had grown. The situation led Roger Traynor, former
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, to comment:
Perhaps in no other area has the discrepancy between law in dogmatic
theory and law in action, evading dogma by fiction and subterfuge, become
so marked as in divorce law. The withered dogma that divorce can be
granted only for marital fault, variously and eccentrically defined from state
to state, is rendered still more irrational by the widespread rule that recrimination is an absolute defense. The result has been triumph, not for dogma,
but for hypocrisy. Rules insensitive to reality have been cynically circumvented by litigants and attorneys, with the tacit sanction of the courts.6 4
The condition finally lead to a self-examination and an appeal to the legislatures for help. Although slow at first, the legislatures have responded with a
variety of statutory forms.
IV. Current "No Fault Divorce" Statutes
The earliest attempts at liberalization of divorce laws were the "incompatibility of temperament" or "incompatibility" statutes." Although on their face
they were a noble attempt at a lessening of the strictness of the fault grounds,
as already observed, they have been interpreted strictly on fault grounds, thereby
frustrating their purpose.
The refusal of the judges to allow more liberal divorce through the "incompatibility" statutes leads to the formulation of a whole new basis for divorce by
legislative commissions:
The objective to strive for is to make it legally possible to end dead marriages....

In the Commission's judgment, a dead marriage is no less dead because
only one of the parties is demonstrably at fault. It must be observed, at this
point, that the demonstrable fault is frequently the result of, rather than the
cause of, marital breakdown....

It is the public interest in private morality, in marriage as an institution, that is best served by terminating marriages that have failed. The outmoded policy of suspending in limbo the offending spouse is the wrong
remedy insofar as public morality is concerned. At the same time, there
is no vested right to immunity from divorce . .. blocking the offender from
64 Traynor, Law and Social'Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 236.
65 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271(7) (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(8) (1953);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110(5) (C) '(1962).
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terminating a meaningless relationship and perhaps creating a socially desirable one.68
At the same time the judges themselves were formulating a new rationale for
divorce:
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological drives that
might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures the care and education of children in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from one
generation to another; it nurtures and develops the individual initiative
that distinguishes a free people. Since the family is the core of our society,
the law seeks to foster and preserve marriage. But when a marriage has
failed and the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life
are no longer served and divorce will be permitted. "[P]ublic policy does
not discourage divorce where the relations between the husband and wife
are such6 7that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed.1
With such purposes in mind, the legislatures set forth to reform the law.
The living apart statute represents the first truly "no fault" divorce statute."8
The second type is the modem "no fault" divorce statute or the marital-breakdown approach. 9 Such statutes make the breakdown of the marriage the sole
basis for divorce. These statutes may be further classified by separating the living apart statute or clause within a statute 0 from the complete revision of the
fault system based upon marital breakdown,71 and putting the marital breakdown principle into the existing adversary system. All three of these groups
have problems, some of which are in common with others.
The New York statute has a living apart clause that implies that a couple
need only live apart for a period of one year. However, the actual living apart
must be pursuant to a court decree or an agreement of separation. This effectively precludes the spouse who has no grounds for separation, and who can't
get his spouse to agree to separate." The long waiting period encourages the
parties to use the quicker fault-ground approach, even though it may mandate
perjury. This will happen particularly where the fault grounds are laxly enforced. The economic and emotional costs of fulfilling the terms of the separation agreement over long periods of time may be prohibitive. Finally, not many
attorneys would recommend separation if a speedier method is available."4
The California statute best exemplifies the marital-breakdown approach,
but it too has its problems. The statute grants a great deal of discretion to the
trial judge. The judge may grant or deny divorce for "irreconcilable differences
66
67

NEw JERsEY REPORT, supra note 60, at 6-8.
DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863-4, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952).
68 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
69 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1971); IOWA CODE § 598 (Supp. 1971);

CIv. CODE §§ 4506-4507 (West 1970).
70 N.Y. Domz. REL. LAw § 170(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
71 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4506-4507 (West 1970).
72 IowA CODE § 598 (Supp. 1971); MIcH. Con,. LAws ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1971).
73 N.Y. Doms. REL. LAW § 170.5 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
74 Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 208.
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which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage".7 5 Irreconcilable differences are defined as "substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved"."
The initial problem with California law is confusion. Each judge is free
to decide for himself what constitutes substantial reasons for discontinuation of
the marriage. It is a rather subjective standard giving the trial judge a tremendous amount of control. It opens the door for interpretations based upon a particular judge's attitude toward divorce. One judge may believe that a heated,
though single, argument is substantial. A second judge, believing in the sanctity
of marriage, could refuse divorce upon any grounds. This situation lends itself
to a possible unequal application of the new divorce law. Additionally, the law
allows the taking of fault evidence in order to determine irreconcilable differences." This could entirely defeat the new divorce law, but many judges reading the legislative history of the law will say irreconcilable differences are an
untriable issue, making the way for a divorce by consent.7" Neither situation
was the intent of the legislators.
A statute similar to the one adopted by the state of California could be
improved by more adequate definitions of terms, the absolute elimination of fault
evidence, and protective measures to prevent unwarranted, unnecessary hasty
divorce. The new California law would work best if it included the family court
process with mandatory conciliation recommended by the Governor's Commission."
The proposed mandatory procedures for the parties to obtain a dissolution
were heavily weighted to encourage them to make use of the court's conciliation and counselling services. If, however, a dissolution was definitely
desired, the proposal aimed at minimizing the conflict and bitterness between
the parties by providing that the proceedings be carried out in as neutral
an environment as possible.80
Rather than fostering this purpose, the legislature just made divorce easier to
obtain.
The Michigan statute puts the marital-breakdown approach into the existing adversary system."' Although Michigan courts do provide recon&liation
service, the system is still adversary in nature. The court favoring reconciliation
may find it difficult to encourage when the attorneys are operating in an adversary nature. A Michigan judge cannot compel anyone to submit to marriage
counselling. 2 The problem is further complicated by the fact that evidence must
be presented in open court, showing "there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed
75 CAL. CIv. CODF § 4506(1) (West 1970).
76 Id. § 4507.
77 Id. § 4509.
78 Comment, The End of Innocence: The Elimination of Fault in California Divorce
Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1306, 1324 (1970).
79 Krom, California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 YAc. L.J. 156, 164
(1970).
80 Id. at 165.
81 MicH. Comp. LAws ANn. § 552.6(1) (Supp. 1971).
82 Mxc. Comp. LAws ANx. § 551.344 (1967).
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and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved." 3
Like the California statute, this allows the trial judge a vast amount of discretion.
Michigan provides that admission of the breakdown by a spouse may be considered by the court but is not binding upon it, thereby demonstrating that the
court has the power to refuse divorce.84 Fortunately, the statute provides the
judge with some guidance in that it doesn't allow for the introduction of fault
claims in a complaint for divorce.85 However, it does not genuinely preclude the
use of fault evidence in open court to show the marriage breakdown. It is difficult to imagine what type of evidence, if any, without resort to fault, can be used
to prove marital breakdown. While it was probably not the intent of the Michigan legislature, as it was not the intent in California, perhaps all that has been
accomplished is to make divorce extremely easy. It remains to be seen how the
Michigan judges will apply the new law. 6
Michigan based the format of its law on the new divorce law of Iowa passed
earlier the same year. 7 Iowa has taken a slightly different approach. It has
adopted the marital-breakdown approach and mandatory conciliation before
divorce is allowed. Originally, the Divorce Laws Study Committee of Iowa, in
its Report, said that all evidence should be permitted in determining marital
breakdown."8 The legislature, however, declined to follow its recommendation,
electing, instead, to eliminate fault grounds.88 This can be interpreted as an
attempt to truly effectuate the purpose of the modem approach to divorce. It
is the elimination of the finger pointing that reduces the bitterness and conflict.
However, the statute does not prohibit the use of fault evidence. It will be interesting to see if Iowa judges, in accordance with the legislative history in the
report of the Divorce Laws Study Committee, allow the introduction of fault
evidence. Iowa has not gone far enough to prevent the judges from returning
to the standards of fault. The new statute should specifically prohibit fault
evidence.
Iowa was concerned with the problem of hasty divorce and set aside a
period of 90 days during which reconciliation counselling is mandatory. No divorce may be granted until that conciliation is completed." Conciliation can
be waived if it can be shown in good faith that it would be to no avail. By the
use of this procedure, Iowa has mitigated the problem of consensual divorce.
The methods Iowa has chosen attempt to remove the proceedings from the adversary context and further the goal of fostering viable marriage relationships.
The Michigan, California and Iowa statutes do not encourage the parties
to proceed on fault grounds in the interest of speed. Marital breakdown, or "no
fault", are the only grounds for divorce in these states. Iowa has gone even
83
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84 Id. § 552.6(2) (Supp. 1971).
85 Id. § 552.6(1) '(Supp. 1971).
86 Discussion with several members of the bar of St. Clair County, Michigan showed that
the local circuit court judges were intending to continue to require showing of fault to determine that the marriage has in fact broken down.
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farther in an effort to foster viable marriage relationships by the use of compulsory conciliation. This minimizes the danger of hasty divorce with which both
California and Michigan could be faced.
In addition to the difficulty over the application of "no fault" principles,
the new laws have done little in the area of child custody. In California, there
is a presumption in favor of the mother, but the child may be awarded to either
the father or the mother in the best interests of the child. " To determine the
best interests of the child, the court may take into consideration evidence of
marital fault,9" but that evidence is not conclusive.93 Michigan also allows the
introduction of fault evidence for the purpose of determining child custody.9 '
Iowa has attempted to provide additional help in this area. Iowa now provides
for the appointment of an attorney to represent the minor child's best interests.
Even here it is difficult to perceive what help he can provide in cases where the
parents are bitterly battling for custody. The attorney will be unable to prevent
emotional stress or bitterness. His greatest contribution will be in his private
investigation and possible participation in the conciliation process.9 Iowa has
made the greatest strides in the area of implementation of "no fault" divorce,
but like its sister states, the new law is not without problems. All three states have
not provided sufficient definitions or adequate guidelines of what constitutes
marital breakdown.
V. Additional Development Is Necessary
There are alternatives which can be used with "no fault" divorce to properly foster the stated purposes of divorce law. This discussion posits that a
marital-breakdown approach represents a better divorce law. It does away with
the hypocrisy of the fault approach, and, more importantly, it can be used to
limit the bitterness and emotional stress associated with the fault system. Since
marital breakdown is not properly a triable issue, this approach opens the door
to divorce by agreement. The use of the alternatives in such cases helps to foster
the purpose of preserving, viable marriages.
The first method is the use of trial marriage. Marriage would be contracted
for a trial period which the parties could terminate by consent. There is no
formal divorce, just an election not to renew the contract. During the trial
period the couple would agree not to have children. Should the couple have
children during the trial period, they automatically ratify the permanent contract. If the couple did elect to renew the contract, it would be of permanent
duration and carry with it the implicit right to have children. The state pro]ably has a smaller interest in a marriage without children. Trial marriage could
provide a speedy remedy where there is little at stake, allowing the couple to
91 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600 (West 1971).
92 Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1965).
93 Morgan v. Morgan, 103 Cal. App. 2d 776, 230 P.2d 130 (1951).
94 Kelso v. Kelso 373 Mich. 592, 130 N.W.2d 418 (1964).
95 Peters, Iowa Reform of Marriage Termination, 20 DRtAxE L. Rv. 211, 221 '(1971).
Here Mr. Peters points out that the attorney who represents the child will have the power to
force the conciliation hearing because it cannot be waived without his consent, although he
hesitates about how much conciliation will really take place.
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freely rebuild their lives after a mistake. However, such a system may on the
whole do very little to promote viable, long lasting marriages.
The second proposal would include tougher requirements to marry within
the legal system." Currently it is more difficult in many states to get a license
to drive an automobile9 7 than it is to get a license to marry,9" yet the marriage
license carries with it an assumption by the state the couple is qualified to raise
children. Since the maturity and age of the partners are often important factors
in divorce, there should be strongly enforced age requirements before marriage
is permitted.99 Secondly, there should be a waiting period' during which people
should be required to take a school class (like a driver education course) about
the state in life they are about to enter. People spend years training for professions and yet when they approach one of the most important states in life, they
do so with no preparation at all. Society has an interest in protecting the future
children of such a marriage, similar to society's right to attempt to protect us
all from bad drivers.
The trouble with these procedures is that society is probably not yet ready
to accept the first one and the second one is too restrictive for today's society.
This is further complicated by today's lower voting age requirements. Their
biggest difficulty is probably that they are pre-marriage requirements. They
provide no help to an existing marriage already in trouble.
VI. Evolutionary Gap Filling
Any proposed modification of the existing "no fault" divorce statutes should
include four basic principles in order to eliminate the problems inherent in the
existing laws. First, marital breakdown should be the only basis for divorce.' 0
The purpose of the law would be to end dead marriages and foster and preserve viable marriage relationships.' 2 The court should never look at marital
fault because it is only evidence of a previous breakdown of the marriage relationship. 3 Second, voluntary conciliation service should be available. A spouse,
with the consent of the other spouse, could give the court jurisdiction over a
conciliation procedure. 4 This would require the establishment of a courtoperated conciliation procedure or a family court.0 5 It would help the couple
work out the problem before a critical stage. Third, conciliation should be required before the granting of any divorce.0 6 This would provide for qualified
96 Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 COLO. L. Rav. 403, 404 (1971).
97 MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.309 (1967).
98 Id. § 551.103.
99 Clark, supra note 96, at 404.
100 Id. at 404.
101 CAL. Crv. CoDE §§ 4506-4507 (West 1970); IowA CoDE § 598 (Supp. 1971)-; Micr.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1971).
102 Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 57, at 78.
103 NEw JERSEY REPORT, supra note 60, at 7.
104 Ma . Comp. LAws ANN. § 551.337 (1967).
105 Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRO. 49 '(1953>. In the
entire article Mr. Chute points out the purpose of a family court and includes a complete

discussion of its operation.
106
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people to decide whether or not a marriage could be saved.'
It would insure
that a couple truly desire a divorce before they could be granted one. Fourth,
at the end of a one year waiting period, divorce should be granted regardless of
whether the parties have participated in reconciliation. This allows the parties
to get a divorce even though they have a strong objection to the conciliation
process, yet it would encourage people to use the conciliation process. Divorce
is generally a last ditch effort and in many cases the parties really desire an
alternative. If a party refuses to enter conciliation for the entire statutory period,
it is probably a good indication of marital breakdown. A divorce in less time
than the statutory waiting period could be obtained only by submitting to the
conciliation process.
These principles would insure the orderly dissolution of marriage without
the pitfalls of the old fault method, or the inadequate provisions of the new
laws. Together they insure that the decision to end this marriage is really the
couple's, but the state provides an additional adequate safeguard against hastiness
in the interests of saving viable marriages.
This system should not overlook the problem of alimony. In many states
alimony is subject to the prejudices of the trial judge because it may be awarded
for fault. The new divorce laws are eliminating this problem, but need adequate
guidelines to replace fault.'
Alimony would be based upon need and the ability
to pay, as determined by the economic status of the spouses at the time of marital
termination." 9 In conjunction with the ability to pay, the social status of the
spouses would also be important, and perhaps even the social and economic
status of the spouses prior to marriage should be considered. Evaluation of the
length of time of the marriage would also be important. This is important in
determining the relative need of the spouses as well as their ability to become
self-supporting."'
Finally, antenuptial agreements should have effect in regard to alimony."'
Should the marriage fail, alimony would already be determined. Perhaps alimony insurance could even be developed to cover this problem. With the use
of our now extensive divorce statistics, computation of premiums is feasible and
a system could be developed. As to the argument that it would foster divorce,
Professor Clark has pointed out:
Presumably one reason why insurance has never before been proposed has
been the familiar attitude that it would be "conducive to divorce", the same
argument which has limited the use of separation agreements. But if nonfault grounds are established, and if divorce is recognized to be one of the
risks of contemporary social existence, similar in effect to death or automobile accidents, there is no convincing reason why insurance
should not
2
at least be considered, and adopted if economically feasible."3
Matters of child custody should be handled similar to Iowa's law. An at107
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tomey should be appointed to represent the interests of the minor children. The
attorney should also have the power to make his own investigation of the best
interests of the children."' The principal provision for the protection of the
children's interests, however, should be the attorney's participation in the conciliation hearing itself. It would thereby allow him to better evaluate the situation and to make recommendations in the best interests of the children.
The implementation of this approach requires further investigation. The
law must be changed to reflect modem thinking. In most cases it requires the
passage of an entirely new divorce law. For states with laws such as those already
examined, only minor amendments are required. The other necessary prerequisite is the assemblage of qualified people to aid the courts in the administration of the law. This has always been a stumbling block, but not a necessarily
insurmountable one.
VII. The Final Application
The most important part of this proposed method of marriage dissolution,
like Iowa's new law, is compulsory conciliation. Conciliation effectuates the
purposes of the new approach to divorce.
In the past, two major problems have caused legislatures to turn away from
conciliation. The primary problem has been the financial expense the program
entails.1 ' The second problem has been the fear of the psychiatrist probing
deeply into the minds of people." 5 Some people do not want this type of help,
considering it an invasion of their privacy." 6 Significant developments in the
field of psychiatry have made these concerns somewhat less important. New
approaches have both reduced cost and done away with the necessity of long
term treatment.
In recent years a tremendous development has taken place in the area
of family counselling techniques."" Family therapy is a method in which the
whole family participates in the same room at the same time with the same
therapist." It is ideally suited for divorce counselling because its purpose is to
promote family equilibrium through the development of family rules. In the
development of family rules the whole family is involved in the decision making
.process. If successful, most of the disagreements causing family problems are
eliminated." It has several other advantages. It does not take an extended
period of time. 20 This has the added effect of cutting cost, thereby eliminating
the prime concern of the legislatures. Additionally, it doesn't allow for a great
deal of time to establish a dependency upon the analyst. The analyst concerns
himself with the current problems. He does not, nor does he have' to, search
113 IowA CoDm § 598.12'(Supp. 1971).
114 Krom, supra note 79, at 171.
115 Bodenheimer, New Approaches of Psychiatry; Implications for Divorce Reform, 1970
UTAH L. Rxv. 191.
116 Some questions have been raised upon the constitutionality of compulsory conciliation
in light of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117 Bodenheimer, supra note 115, at 191.
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out the deep seated causes of people's behavior. The purpose is to allow the
parties to work out the solutions for themselves. Perhaps one of the biggest
advantages of the use of this approach in compulsory conciliation is that it works
upon individuals who don't
want to participate almost as well as on people
21
who desire to participate.1

Another new form of psychiatry which works well in divorce counselling
is Reality-Therapy. Like Family Therapy, it has the advantages of requiring little
time for treatment, and no need to probe the past mind for deep seated causes.
The principal approach of Reality Therapy is to confront the person with reality
and thereby help him to accept responsibility and plan his future actions. It
encourages people to see things as they are. The analyst encourages the patient
to do things which will help him change his attitude about others. This is often
just what is needed in a divorce counselling situation. It is not a deep mindsearching probe; rather, it takes the form of advice. It could be called nothing
more than an intense form of advice and counselling. 2
Psychiatry now has the means to effectively work within the legal framework in support of the new approach to divorce.
Practically speaking, it is evident that the "new psychiatry" offers. us
radically shortened treatment time; availability of services when needed in
a crisis; increasing emphasis on communication and interrelation, especially
within the family; a declining interest in unconscious motivation; deemphasis on labels of mental illness; and a great deal of practical, down-

to-earth advice. This kind of therapy is not a luxury for the privileged
28
few, but a service within the financial reach of the private or public purse.'
Research shows that compulsory conciliation is probably the better method
in divorce law. Evidence indicates that individual psychotherapy with only one
party to a weak marriage often leads to divorce, while joint therapy has the
tendency to strengthen the family. 24 Compulsory conciliation provides leverage
which is necessary to get both parties together to try the "new psychiatry."
Once tried,. it is possible for it to work, because it has been proved to be effective
with people who do not want to participate.
Most people, when presented with an alternative to divorce, are relieved
and eager to try it. 25 This requires that we do the utmost to preserve the marriage. If the result is divorce, the system has not failed. There is still much good
to be gained from the conciliation conferences. Matters of property settlement,
alimony and child custody can be settled amicably in the conference, rather than
in the courtroom. In the non-hostile atmosphere, these matters can be settled in
the best interests of the parties, their children and the law.
VIII. Conclusion
In the divorce area the states of California, Michigan and Iowa have taken
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a dramatic step to leave the past behind. They have made a noble attempt at
revamping the law of divorce. To a large degree, they have been successful and
all three are on the right path. However, they have all failed in providing the
guidance necessary for the administration of the system. In order to completely
achieve the purpose of fostering viable marriage relationships, some additions
are needed. -All three states need more adequate guidelines defining and limiting
the type of evidence which can be introduced. It is necessary to provide clear
cut standards so that a judge can determine that a marriage has broken down
within the meaning of the law. Without such standards, the future of divorce
law depends upon the particular attitudes of those on the bench.
Continued attention must be given to the areas of alimony and child
custody. As we enter the no fault era, new alimony laws must be formulated.
Methods must be established for the ease in determination of more equitable
alimony awards. Use of the antenuptial agreement is only one suggested approach.
Child custody is one of the most vital awards made in a divorce proceeding.
Care must be taken to see that the best interests of the children are really. taken
into consideration. Iowa's use of the outside attorney for the children must
represent only the beginning. New procedures must continue to be developed.
In an effort to effectively promote viable marriage relationships, Michigan
and California should adopt a mandatory conciliation procedure like that in the
Iowa law. Further, all three states should take full advantage of the-new services
which can be provided by the "new psychiatry."
If a truly equitable and socially helpful divorce law is to be developed, the
reformers must not stop now. The state commissions which have made the
proposal for the current reforms must continue to evaluate the law. It is necessary that new reforms be proposed and adopted as needed. Only in this way
can the law of divorce become a living law in tune with the needs of the people.
Michael J. Whaling

